Erhardt+Leimer India Limited: Strategic Transformation through ERP
S Kaushika Madhavan
Erhardt+Leimer India Limited (ELIL), in the business of textile and related equipment manufacturing, is facing increased competition, stagnation in revenue, and eroded profitability. ELIL's parent company in Germany had implemented Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) solutions to enhance its effectiveness and had offered ELIL some licences free of cost. Mr S Rajaram, Vice-President (Operations) of ELIL, though excited about the possibility of adopting ERP solutions is also concerned about implementation issues. They are: inadequate computing infrastructure, need for substantial investment, need to improve process orientation, data discipline, the prevailing organizational culture, and the high rate of failure in ERP implementation. Considering that he has to make a recommendation to the Board on ERP implementation, he is wondering whether ELIL is prepared for this change.
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On 15th March 1999, Mr S Rajaram, Vice-President (Operations) at Erhardt+Leimer India Limited (ELIL), was wondering whether to implement the SAP R/3 Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) package at his Odhav factory in Ahmedabad. The company's German principals, Erhardt+Leimer GmbH, had recently offered some licenses of SAP R/3 free of cost to their Indian partner.
More specifically, he wondered whether his company was prepared to implement an ERP package considering that there were lot of issues he should take care of before an ERP implementation. The comment from his board of directors about ERP being suitable only for big-sized companies was troubling him. Also, he was aware that ERP implementation would involve heavy capital expenditure, though he had forecasted attractive returns by way of high inventory turnover and faster response time. Considering the high rate of failure in ERP implementation, he was concerned about the fall-back options that needed to be planned.
ELIL: Background
ELIL was incorporated as a joint venture in November 1978 by Erhardt+Leimer GmbH, Germany, and ATE Enterprises, Mumbai. Erhardt+Leimer GmbH, founded in 1919, was a pioneer in web-handling technology and offered web-guiding, controlling, and monitoring systems for textile, paper, film and foil converting, tire cord and light metal converting industries.
ATE Enterprises, founded in 1939, was a marketing organization employing 400 people in sales and service and was spread across seven regional offices in India. It was a promoter of several joint ventures and represented many Indian and foreign textile machine manufacturers in India.
Of the Rs 7.0 million equity in ELIL, ATE Enterprises held 49 per cent and E+L Germany held 40 per cent. In 1999, ELIL employed 165 personnel and had a modern factory with 1800 m 2 factory space Vol. 25, No. 3, July-September 2000 57 Vikalpa and 1200 m 2 office space. ELIL had Quality Management Systems which were in accordance with ISO 9001-1994 , as certified by TUV-Management Services GmbH, Germany. The financial highlights of ELIL are given in Table 1. ELIL started its commercial production in 1981. Until 1984, the company incurred losses. In 1985, there was a turnaround with a reported profit of Rs 650,000. In 1983, ELIL commenced manufacturing web-handling products for paper and plastic industry so as to offset the business fluctuation in the textile industry. As of 1998, the textile industry contributed only 30 per cent of the total turnover of ELIL. In 1984-85, the company diversified into specialized control panels and was primarily supplying to its sister companies. In 1995, the sister companies stopped purchasing these from ELIL, and started manufacturing them on their own which resulted in ELIL actively seeking outside clients.
Product-Market Characteristics
ELIL provided a full range of web-guiding and controlling equipment for textile, paper, and foil industries. The products included a weft straightener for textile industry (in collaboration with J Mensch- 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997- 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997- Vol. 25, No. 3, July-September 2000 58 Vikalpa ner GmbH, Germany), a corona treater for plastic, film, and aluminum foils (in collaboration with Softal Electronic GmbH, Germany), and air shafts for paper, foil and film converters (in collaboration with Emtek Corporation, USA). ELIL also manufactured customized control panels for process automation.
Manufacturing web-handling equipment was an exacting area of precision engineering, requiring both mechanical ingenuity and considerable electronics expertise. The design and fabrication of such equipment were particularly challenging. ELIL's production facility employed CNC machines and sophisticated electronics handling and testing machinery, including wave soldering equipment and digital storage oscilloscopes. Control software was developed inhouse and was even exported to E+L, Germany. With this infrastructure and technology, ELIL . established itself as a major player in the Indian web-handling industry (Table 2) .
Product Characteristics
ELIL manufactured a wide variety of products; from standard to customized; from low volume to high volume (1 piece per annum to 1000 pieces per annum); from low value to high value (Rs 10,000 a unit to Rs 1.6 million a unit). There were about 25 product groups with a total of 60 variants. Though ELIL's products were accessories to capital equipment, they significantly improved the quality of the end product and increased their productivity. Nearly 20 per cent of sales of ELIL were in standard products and the remaining were customized to specific application or client needs. In customized items, approximately 60 per cent of the assemblies and components were standard items and the remaining were order-specific.
Customers
As of 1999, ELIL had about 2600 customers who were broadly classified into Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and direct-end customers. OEM business was more or less standard (mostly with a one-time design). For example, a printing machine manufacturer would be ELIL's customer, with ELIL supplying all the accessories that go with the printing machine. Since printing machine would be a standard product for the OEM, ELIL's orders too were of standard design. The OEMs supplied their products to many customers and thus gave ELIL bulk orders.
The market share of ELIL varied in different categories. It ranged from absolute majority in textiles to a very small number in some of the new products launched by ELIL recently. Table 3 summarizes the market share, customer profile, and sales contribution details of the different product segments of ELIL as of 1997-98. Each segment had its own technological intricacy and market dynamics. The customer segments addressed by the products were also different.
Competition
Each product segment of ELIL had different competitors. Most of the competitors of ELIL were small players with a turnover of Rs 20 to 30 million. Very few competitors had a range of products similar to ELIL. The competition was, thus, focused in a few products and specific market segments, which enabled them to offer lower prices, better delivery, and more attractive terms and conditions. For example, ELIL was unable to adopt lower pricing strategy in one product area because it had implications in all its other segments as well. Therefore, ELIL often resorted to product crosssubsidization. The company also had a more recent problem of several small manufacturers routinely copying ELIL's design and offering spurious products in the market.
Over the years, ELIL had gradually added on a set of complementary products to its portfolio. The company was a single point source of accessories supply to several OEMs. The wide product variety of ELIL made its operations complex (Table 4) .
Textile Products
In this segment, ELIL had about 80 per cent market share by volume and was known for superior quality and excellent customer service. There were only a few major comparable competitors.
Paper and Plastic Products
In this segment, the competition was intense. Out of seven active competitors, three copied ELIL's products. In 1995, an international player from Germany had set up a joint venture in India in this segment. This competitor was emerging as a serious threat in the web-guiding system by its focused attention to a particular segment.
Control and Automation
The control and automation market was shared by several small-scale players, mid-sized companies who made their own drives and components that go into making panels, and organized players like Larsen & Toubro, Siemens, etc. ELIL wanted to position itself in the middle segment by offering solutions and product quality like that of organized players at an attractive price. Even though this market was shared by numerous players, ELIL was attracted to this segment because of sheer market size. Also, making panels complemented the range of equipment already manufactured by ELIL.
Organization
ELIL's organization structure was represented by marketing, works, finance and accounting, control and automation, R&D, and IT (Chart 1).
Marketing
The marketing department evolved the Long Range Plan (LRP) and provided monthly shipment schedule to the works department. The other responsibilities included promoting new products, identifying new product ideas based on interaction with the customers, competitor analysis, market share augmentation, advertisements, supporting the regions in marketing, and payment collection. It also handled the customer Manager (Q&A) service function, sales and service in Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh. In the remaining regions, ATE Enterprises was the sole selling agent. There were seven regional sales offices each with a sales manager who managed the regional sales.
Sales Forecasting
Sales forecasting, called LRP, was one of the key activities of the marketing department. Material planning was based on LRP. Since raw materials involved imports and long lead time items, the accuracy of LRP was critical. At the end of every calendar year, all the product and regional managers met to discuss the market situation, inquiries on hand, new projects in the pipeline, and past sales data. The yearly forecast was the outcome of this meeting. The product managers modified this figure based on past experience to arrive at the final forecast for the next year starting from April. This sales figure was then split into quarter-wise sales based on previous experience. This was used to facilitate import planning. At the beginning of each quarter, a more accurate plan was arrived at based on region-wise feedback and actual orders on hand. These quarterly forecasts were fine-tuned as and when the actual order situation unfolded.
The accuracy of the forecast depended on ATE Enterprises which was responsible for sales in most of the regions. ELIL submitted a monthly report of the actual sale to ATE Enterprises to ensure some feedback on the forecasting process adopted by it. The company also tried long-term arrangements with the OEMs so as to get a better handle on the demand. Recently, a study of the OEMs' business was undertaken to enrich the LRP. Quantity discount and better terms and conditions were used to encourage OEMs to place bulk orders. But, in a slump year, many of these strategies did not work.
Monthly Shipment Schedule
On the first day of every month, an eight-week delivery schedule was communicated to the production department. The first four-week schedule was based on the actual customer orders available. The schedule for the subsequent four-week period was tentative. The production department analysed the delivery requirement based on material and capacity availability and made suitable modifications. The final production schedule was arrived at after a detailed interaction between marketing and production departments (Table 5) . "Service is our strong point. All our service engineers are located at the regions. Necessary spares are stored in the regional offices. We ensure that the customer equipment is not idle for want of consumables or components. All customer complaints are attended to within 48 hours. All complaints should be resolved within seven days time. These two norms govern service department operations."
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Structure
Customer service was similar to marketing in organizational structure. Customer support engineers in charge of after sales service, repairing, handling complaints during warranty, and annual maintenance contracts were stationed at Ahmedabad, Chennai, Mumbai, Delhi, and Calcutta. The plant could attend to both component level and product level repairing and hence all major complaints were handled at the plant level. Free service was provided for any product fault during the guarantee period.
Complaint Monitoring Process
Whenever a customer complaint was received, a Customer Complaint Report (CCR) was opened and was closed only when the complaint was resolved. The CCR was taken as a base for assessing product quality, product performance, and customer satisfaction.
A Pareto analysis was done on the reported failures during guarantee period. Every quarter, the complaints were ranked based on the frequency of occurrence for each product. The next step was the identification of the item that caused the complaints most frequently. The third step was the identification of the particular cause that led to the fault in the considered item. Corrective action was accordingly initiated.
The financial value of components used to solve customer complaints was measured every quarter. Subsequently, a management meeting involving all the concerned departments (design, purchase, Quality and Assurance (Q&A), production) was held and the CCR was closed.
Because of the wide variety of products and subassemblies, the same complaint could occur in a different product and at a different point in time. In spite of efforts to identify the causes for such recurrence and initiating appropriate remedies, there was no substantial reduction in the number of complaints. Considering that the Pareto analysis was initiated only in 1997, Shah hoped that in a year or two, there would be a reduction in the'problems encountered.
Works
The works division was organized into design, production, materials, personnel and administration, electronic assembly, and industrial engineering departments. A manager headed each department.
Design
The design department handled three kinds of products, viz., standard, customized, and new product development. Standard products involved one time design, most of which came from E+L, Germany. ELIL modified the design of the product to suit local conditions. These changes were often one time in nature. Customized products occupied the bulk of the design department's time. E-I-L, Germany gave the primary design and ELIL adapted them to local conditions to suit customer needs, material availability, etc. The department released about 50 different design documents every month. Product development was a recent activity and the first prototype was to be ready by May 1999.
The design department generated the bill of material (BoM), specification sheet, layout and manufacturing drawings, and other design documents. Based on the BoM and considering the material and capacity availability status, the production department estimated the possible delivery date for an order. For a customized product proposal, the marketing department had to get the BoM generated from the design department and pass it on to the production department to get an estimation of possible delivery date.
Materials
The materials department was organized as purchase, stores, and production planning and control (PPC). Packaging and despatch of goods was handled by the stores.
Purchase
The purchase department received the LRP from the marketing department in February every year which gave the quarterly forecast. The production planning allocated the workload to each month in a quarter. A Material Requirement Planning (MRP) programme was run with six months as the planning horizon. This generated the monthly parts forecast. Based on this, a detailed purchase schedule was made. This was communicated to a set of buyers in the purchase department who initiated purchase action for raw materials and imported components. Usually, certain sub-assemblies had to be fabricated. Purchase actions for these items started only after the BoM came from the design unit. Open order (rate contract) for frequently used items was used. Since there was indiscriminate ordering, it resulted in inventory build-up and hence this policy was discontinued.
The purchase department was also in-charge of vendor management. Most of the items used in ELIL had at least two vendors. Of the 2600 vendors registered with the company, about 500 were active. These vendors were classified into A, B, C, and D based on a vendor rating system. Higher classification of a vendor led to possible self-certification on quality. Their products got directly delivered to the stores without going through the Q&A department. As an active policy, ELIL endeavoured to move all the vendors to A class.
Stores
The main function of the stores department was material receipt and issue. This department kept a minimum and maximum level for each item and did stock accounting once a year. At any point in time, the value of materials in the stores was approximately Rs 25 million. This was considered to be very high and efforts were on to reduce the inventory. In spite of having such a high inventory, there were several occasions when there was a stock-out on a specific item and rush orders had to be initiated for production. These were ordered based on the quarterly forecasts given in the LRP. But, the actual orders for ELIL products turned out to be different resulting in unused stock. Ordering raw materials and components after receiving orders from customers would lead to delayed delivery. Thus, forecasting of actual material requirements was difficult.
Production Planning and Control
The production planning and control (PPC) department did aggregate capacity planning and scheduling. Shop scheduling was done component-wise by PPC as per the job card based on the process layout. But, daily scheduling and progress monitoring was done by respective shops. Scheduling activities were done manually. ELIL adopted group scheduling. All the components required for a sub-assembly were scheduled together in the shop floor. A monthly despatch programme, which was split into weekly despatch programme, given by the marketing department was the basis for scheduling. The scheduling algorithm was delivery date driven and moved backwards. Therefore, all the items that were required on the first week were scheduled first, on second week were scheduled next and so on.
Production
The production shop layout was process-based. The machines were general purpose in nature. Batch production (with batch sizes ranging from 5 to 200) was undertaken. There were standard products and customized products. Customized products had standard modules as well as non-standard modules. ELIL followed both manufactured-to-stock and manufactured-to-order principles. In the control panel area, ELIL manufactured to order. All these different activities were managed in the same shop floor.
There were four distinct activities in the production shop. In addition to a normal order, the shop worked on either an urgent, a spare or an export order. Approximately 20 per cent of all the orders executed by ELIL were urgent orders. To accommodate an urgent order, either an existing order (under processing) got diverted or a finished order, not taken delivery of by the original customer, got modified. On most occasions, urgent orders were entertained resulting in unexpected delay in other customer orders.
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Nearly 8 per cent of the monthly production was for spares. The shop had a yearly and quarterly forecasting system for spares. This was further finetuned by the monthly requirements. In spite of all these, unpredicted spare demand was usual. The company policy directed the production shop to remove the necessary spare from a new product under production and deliver it as a spare.
Export orders were standard orders, given a year in advance by E+L, Germany. ELIL had been very regular in export orders. The export consignment was planned roughly two months in advance.
According to Mr Shukla, in charge of production:
"My personal observation is that our delivery adherence is 80 per cent of what is committed. In the remaining 20 per cent, most of the orders are moderately delayed. But, in cases involving import of materials or if there is a rejection and the entire process has to be repeated, then the orders are very late. But such occurrences are rare." According to Mr Shah: "Whenever there is an export consignment, there is a drop in the delivery performance of the domestic orders." Capacity utilization of the CNC machines was between 70-80 per cent. The material availability (not production capacity) was usually a constraint.
According to Mr Shukla:
"Orders worth Rs 4 million to Rs 16 million have been manufactured in a single month. The highest was Rs 22.3 million in one month. This was achieved with additional efforts and initiatives like sub-contracting."
Nearly 65 per cent of manufacturing in ELIL was customized. All major manufacturing activity started only after engineering drawings were released. Only the manufacturing of standard parts of a tailor-made order was initiated before hand.
For export orders, ELIL was cautious and measured accurately even dimensions which were till recently not measured. This had resulted in an increase in the rejection rate to 2.5 per cent in 1999 as compared to previous year's value of 1.2 per cent. Monthly data on rejection were usually analysed if they went beyond acceptable levels. The reasons were tabulated and corrective action was decided during a joint departmental meeting.
Industrial Engineering Department
This department developed process layout, time and motion study, and the sequence of operations to be carried out on each job in the workshop and in the assembly shop.
Personnel and Administration
The broad functions of this department were employee selection for the organization at all levels, welfare activities, time keeping, industrial relations, union negotiation, training, and general administration.
ELIL employees were classified into three cadres, viz., workers, staff, and executives. Corporate HR department in Mumbai handled employees at the level of GM and above. The workers were unionized. This was a non-affiliated union. Since inception, ELIL had maintained a cordial relation with the union.
Finance and Accounting Department
Finance and accounting, costing, company secretaryrelated work, fund management, management information system (MIS), and Forex related work were the broad functions of this department. Accounts was the first area to be computerized in 1991. The finance department was the sole custodian of key information in the company.
ELIL was unable to do a profitability analysis or costing for individual products. The programmes for costing were developed but were not fully utilized. At ELIL, not all computer programmes developed were used. The reason was non-existence of fool-proof methods of data collecting. For example, there were two different BoMs for each product (one generated by the materials and the other by design). The wide product variety was another impediment in using the costing systems to the maximum extent. Also, labour time recording by the supervisors was not reliable and accurate.
Control and Automation Division
This division operated independently of the rest of the organization. It had a separate marketing, design, assembly, testing, commissioning, and after-sales service set-up in place. Purchase and stores functions were shared with ELIL. The sales contribution of this division was about Rs 5 million (98-99) not including Vol. 25, No. 3, July-September 2000 64 Vikalpa the work done for ELIL's products. Its function was to design and deliver control and automation solutions to the customers. The prime focus of this division was mainly flexible packaging industry.
Evolution of Information Systems
ELIL had an IT department with a staff strength of two. The primary function of the IT department was to maintain and modify the system software to meet user requirements.
Early Days
ELIL initiated computerization in 1991 when it adopted a mini computer (ORG Supermax) based solution. Oracle 5.0 was installed. This system was upgraded to a RISC processor in 1995. Simultaneously, Oracle 5.0 applications were transferred to Oracle 7.0 (and not rewritten using Oracle 7.0 features). The modules implemented included sales, finance, costing, stores and purchase, MRP, and payroll.
Initial system development at ELIL was done by Operations Research Group (ORG) and had been subsequently modified and upgraded by the in-house software staff. There was no system documentation. Therefore, troubleshooting and upgradation was nearly impossible. Continuous design changes had been carried out in the past years. There were several options in the installed package. Some of the options were un-used and their application was not very clear to the IT manager and users. But, the system was technically considered to be comprehensive covering most of ELIL functions.
Hardware
There were three servers in ELIL -a UNIX (ORG Supermax), an NT server, and a Novell 3.12 server. UNIX had all the home-grown software. NT was used for office automation. MS Exchange server was used for e-mail services. The Novell server was used in the design department mostly for Computer Aided Design (CAD).
ELIL had an e-mail connectivity through Wipro BT server in Ahmedabad. Also, there was a single dial-up internet account with VSNL. There were about 50 nodes of which 15 were Pentiums and the rest were 486s. The network used 100 Mbps network cabling. The maintenance support for the ORG hardware was expected to decline in the near future (the company had stopped the manufacture of such hardware since 1997).
Internet Presence
In 1997, ELIL set up its own internet web page (www.erhardt-leimer-india.com).
Need for Improved IT Support
Even though ELIL had an extensive computer system in place, it was not without its limitations. The basic requirements of functional departments are summarized below.
Marketing
The existing system provided no assistance in sales forecasting. Order status was not on-line. This resulted in unnecessary paper transfer and wasteful expenditure on data search and communication as significant information had to be exchanged between the regional offices and the factory.
Since factory loading and material availability details were also not available on-line, it was not possible for the marketing department to evaluate an urgent order to suggest a delivery date for a prospective customer.
Design
The system did not have a link with CAD/ CAM applications. Therefore, after making a drawing for an order, the BOM for that order had to be manually transferred to the system for MRP and subsequent order processing.
Works
The various modules were not tightly integrated with each other resulting in data duplication, redundancy, and inaccuracy. The output of MRP did not update stock automatically. MRP output did not trigger automatic Purchase Order (PO) release. The MRP output had to be manually transferred to the order processing system, resulting in non-value added work, delay, and data errors.
MRP processing was inefficient. It took 10-12 hours for processing. Given the frequent changes in the forecasts, it became necessary to run the MRP Vol. 25, No. 3, July-September 2000 65 Vikalpa frequently which resulted in significant delays. Actual lead time based on a vendor's performance was not considered by the MRP programme automatically.
Capacity planning and scheduling were manual. Urgent orders could not be handled by the production planning department. Also, since urgent orders had to be manually scheduled, it delayed other standard orders. Only limited options related to scheduling were considered. Because of the complexity of current scheduling, it was not possible to know up-front which machine centre was going to be a bottleneck in the present system.
The system did not facilitate efficient inventory management as evidenced by an inventory turnover of 4. Also, multiple level inventory control was not possible. Inventory balancing could not be achieved due to a large number of items in stock, a large number of product variants, and constant revisions in LRP. Approximately, every year, inventory worth Rs 8-Rs 10 million was disposed off as non-moving inventory.
There was no maintenance module in the existing system. Therefore, the maintenance of machinery was delayed and, consequently, shop floor experienced moving bottlenecks. The remedy was usually production facility sub-contracting. Order cancellation paper work (resulting in cancelling orders on the vendors) was to be done manually. Spare requirement forecast was not available. Stock and pending PO allocation was done manually.
Finance and Accounts
The system did not help in cash-flow analysis, account receivable management, and planning for accounts payable. Another problem was priority payment to the vendors. There was no on-line data on pending payments. Facility for automatic bill passing was not available.
Process Discipline
"My system allows people to bypass the procedures'," said Mr Rajaram.
For example, it was not always necessary to go through the purchasing process to get the required material. Regularization was possible. Items meant for one order were used for another order. Thus, individual performance was optimized at the cost and efficiency of the (larger) system. Such bypass procedures caused friction between executives. Data entry was neither regular nor prompt resulting in open job orders even after goods had been despatched. Similarly, the finance department did not run the end-of-the-day processing every day. It waited for a few days to carry out some correction using journal vouchers (to adjust for some previous mistakes). Till recently, the purchase department used to come to EDP to authorize the POs in the absence of the Vice-President (Materials) or the Works Manager.
Office Automation
The systems did not provide efficient management information system. The systems were characterbased and did not support graphic data representation. Also, independent report preparation by the user was not possible. In areas like sales and accounts, the data (original) from the systems were transferred to packages like Excel to do further analysis and reporting.
The ERP Proposal
In the past year, ELIL had been facing a flat growth in the market, an increasing pressure on price and margin, shortening product life-cycles, and increasing wages. Competition had been growing and intensifying. ELIL was faced with low-cost (focused) competitors who quoted better price and shorter delivery times. It was becoming increasingly important for ELIL to be quick on delivery. These dynamics necessitated ELIL to strive for reduced manufacturing lead time, increased inventory turnover, and faster response to customer inquiries. The current IT system was not of much help in these areas.
SAPR/3 Option
Commenting on the motivation to implement an ERP solution in ELIL, Mr Rajaram said: "E+L, Germany went live on SAP R/3 in October 1998. They have acquired a 300 user license and used only 200 licenses. They have offered to give us a few licenses free of cost. This offer came in at a juncture when our legacy systems are becoming out-dated and support for the ORG system is being discontinued by the vendor."
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Costs and Benefits
The hardware cost including network upgradation to suit SAP implementation was expected to be Rs 2.5 million. Even if SAP was not implemented, approximately Rs 1.5-1.7 million was planned to be spent on upgrading the ORG hardware to Pentiumbased system. The ERP implementation cost was expected to be between Rs 6 million and Rs 8 million.
ELIL's internal yearly return calculation is given in Table 6 . The expected yearly returns was to the tune of 4.8 per cent of Profit Before Tax (PBT) in 1999-2000. The turnover in 1999-2000 was assumed to be Rs 140 million. The inventory turnover was expected to increase to 5.5 leading to a savings of about Rs 5.5 million in the working capital. Savings in employee cost was assumed to be about 10 per cent of the current levels. This was expected to be achieved by using the same employees for the increased sales. The account receivable was expected to come down by ten days from the current level of about 80 days. 2. PBT is taken at 10 per cent of sales.
Expectations from ERP
Mr Rajaram had a clear set of expectations from the ERP:
"I expect ERP to achieve all the following goals: increase inventory turnover to 6 or 7; reduce the manufacturing lead time to 2-5 weeks from the current 4-8 weeks; facilitate quicker response to urgent orders from customers; provide accurate spares delivery forecast; reduce cost of operation; and provide accurate costing system. In addition, all the current limitations of the legacy system needs to be overcome." ERP was expected to help in bringing discipline in the operations of the company. Most of the department heads were not clear on the features of an ERP package. However, they had a clear wish list from ERP.
Marketing
The first and foremost expectation of the marketing department from ERP was more accurate LRP by incorporating the available proposals and past experience on percentage success from proposal stage (delivery chance percentage). ERP was expected to assist marketing efforts by clearly giving on-line commitment about the earliest delivery date possible. On-line order acceptance from regions was the next area where ERP was expected to improve the current process. ERP was also expected to provide on-line order status to agents thereby reducing the two to four days lead time prevalent now.
Customer Service
The customer service department expected service response analysis to be automatic. To facilitate this, the BoMs should be available on-line so that as soon a customer complaint is registered, the service engineer could identify the corresponding item code on-line and take further action. All engineering change notes should be available on-line. Contribution of a service engineer to the service should be available from ERP.
TA bill analysis had to be computerized. Frequently, the service engineers had to make a service call because of non-service related reasons; for example, the sales department might have committed free servicing beyond the guarantee period to get the order. Such additional expenses needed to be allocated to the respective department. 
Works
Design "If ERP is implemented it would reduce a lot of our avoidable jobs," said Mr Shukla.
The same feeling was echoed by Mr Manoj Shah, the Materials Manager. He was confident that automation of a lot of manual chores that his people were engaged in would make his department more efficient. On a rough estimate, he felt that about 40 per cent of his engineers' time was spent on regularizing paper work, closing job cards, etc., which if taken care of by ERP would release them for productive work.
Response time to marketing queries was variable and large. It varied from two hours to two days for customized orders. It was very difficult to give the earliest delivery date for orders in the pipeline. ERP was expected to reduce this time.
Each run of MRP took about 12 hours. This had to be done much faster to accommodate the frequent running of MRP due to changes in the LRP. Performance evaluation was more or less computerized. But, linking the machine working to output was necessary. Material tracking was currently done manually and was very cumbersome. This had to be automated.
Status of order acknowledgment was required on-line. Status of a running order and status of Workin-Progress (WIP) should be available on-line.
ELIL would like to go towards a system where it could keep easy-to-assemble, standard, and customized modules and sub-modules in stock rather than the completely assembled finished good. This had two advantages. The space requirements for the inventory would come down drastically (the finished goods occupy between 5 and 10 times the volume of the component modules). Secondly, in case of an urgent order, it would not be necessary to dismount a standard module from an assembled order, thus saving the post-assembly testing efforts. For this kind of inventory policy, monitoring of the inventories at various levels like standard modules, sub-modules, and the component level would be necessary, which was expected from ERP.
Thus, ERP was expected to reduce lead times, ensure better capacity utilization, reduce WIP, increase certainty in delivery, assure a realistic delivery promise, improve customer satisfaction, ensure better stores, spares, and purchase management, and higher inventory turns. Integration with finance and production was expected to lead to better material tracking and reduction in procurement lead time. . 25, No. 3, July-September 2000 68 Mr Sunil Dosani, IT Manager, was excited about the drawing and document handling systems available in SAP. He felt that this might be the answer to the complex needs of the design department as the facilities in SAP permitted the drawings to be stored in templates with various customizable elements of the drawing stored in an option list. When a new proposal came up, the engineers had to first open the template and click the relevant option to generate a new drawing.
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The design department expected ERP to provide variant management, interface to CAD/CAM software, facility of drawing master, and customer profiling. These features were expected to result in faster configuration leading to reduction in design lead time, increased sale, and increased ability to handle more product variety.
Work Flow
ERP was expected to bring in work flow automation to enforce process discipline and thereby improve office productivity.
Finance and Accounts
ERP was expected to help in forecasting accounts payable and receivable. This would enable more accurate cash flow prediction to ensure better funds management at ELIL.
Mr Rajesh Shah, General Manager (Accounts), expected ERP to instil a system of objective data collection mechanism which would enable him to do product costing and product-wise profitability analysis. It would also enable a planned move towards activity-based costing system and flexible budgeting.
Working capital was expected to reduce due to better inventory management and increased control on payment collection. Prompt payments to vendors would be the basis to improve suppliers relationship.
Management Information System
Budgetary control, on-line accounting, profitability analysis, and performance measurement system were the MIS features expected from the ERP package. These features were expected to provide control over Vikalpa cost, improved process efficiency, more time for technical planning, and faster and effective decisionmaking.
Conclusion
The ERP proposal was not without its concerns. The primary concern was the possibility of failure in implementation. A group company Trumac had a failure in an MRP-II implementation. Another area of concern was the lack of knowledge about the feature set available in SAPR/3. "What are the features not available in the ERP package is not clear" said Mr Shah.
It was not clear whether the kind of sales forecasting required by ELIL was available in SAP. Another area in which SAP feature set might not be complete was finance and accounting. ELIL collected fixed deposits from public to finance its activities. SAP could not accommodate this feature. Also, there were concerns on whether the finance module was tuned to Indian tax regime and included features like MODVAT and tax deduction at source.
It was said that ERP implementation took up to 40 per cent of the managers' time. The year 2000 was the ISO review year for ELIL. In addition, marketing was going through a tough time due to unfavourable market conditions. Thus, the quantum of work on ELIL was expected to be quite high.
ERP implementation meant a large capital outlay. In fact, Rajaram was planning to generate funds for ERP implementation by sacrificing capital expenditure and funds based on long-term borrowing on machinery in the next year. It was not evident whether the return on the ERP would justify this.
Also, ERP implementation implied adopting the practices built in the package. This would necessitate changes in the business processes, information transparency, and the attitude of the employees. Was ELIL prepared for this change in terms of readiness of its processes and people to adopt new methods? . 25, No. 3, July-September 2000 69 Vikalpa
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